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Abstract
Price and promotion strategy have been widely dis-
cussed in multichannel retailing, but little study was fo-
cused on the promotion strategy in the context of multi-
ple platforms. Through transaction data from a com-
pany’s different platforms, our study investigated the 
impact of promotion integration strategy on company’s 
overall sales performance on different platforms. Com-
bined with platform’s index data about product market 
demand, the moderating effect of platform’s market de-
mand was further evaluated. Using a fixed-effect model, 
our research found the positive effect of promotion tim-
ing integration and the negative effect of promotion 
depth integration on sales performance. We also found 
the moderating effect of platform’s market demand. 
Thus, our study generates important theoretical and 
practical implications for managing promotion activity 
on multiple platforms.  
. 
1.  Introduction 
Nowadays, in order to get higher online market share, 
more and more companies sell products through more 
than one platform. On these multiple platforms, compa-
nies always do a lot of promotion activity by using the 
platform’s various functions. Researchers suggested 
that there exists both synergy and cannibalization effect 
among multiple platforms [8, 11]. Thus, it is crucial for 
companies to manage multiple platforms’ promotion ac-
tivity. Existing studies have discussed about the price 
and promotion strategy in multichannel retailing. Most 
of them suggested for the promotion integration strategy, 
which is defined as providing consistent price discount 
in the various channels simultaneously [16]. But some 
scholars have opposite opinion, such as [4] and [13]. 
That research has made contribution about promotion 
management in multichannel retailing. However, differ-
ent channels have varied cost structural [23], which 
leads to the difference among each channel’s promotion 
decision. But in the context of multiple platforms, such 
differentiation would be smaller. Moreover, customers 
can search and compare product and price information 
with lower costs in the context of multiple platforms 
than in multichannel retailing. Thus, due to the lower 
information asymmetry, the conclusion from multichan-
nel retailing may not be suitable in the context of multi-
ple platforms. Therefore, this study aims to investigate 
how to manage multiple platforms’ promotion activity.  
Marketing researchers revealed that promotion deci-
sion involves two aspects, which includes promotion 
depth and promotion frequency [9]. For retailers who 
enter multiple platforms, they must decide the extent of 
promotion depth integration and promotion timing inte-
gration. The former refers to the similarity of different 
platforms’ discount rates for the same product, while the 
latter stands for whether retailers implement the promo-
tion activity simultaneously in the different platforms. 
Hence, this study echoes the call of scholars [14] to in-
vestigate whether the promotion integration strategy 
(i.e., promotion depth integration and promotion timing 
integration) would influence company’s overall sales 
performance on multiple platforms.   
Moreover, existing literature suggested that the mar-
ket environment would influence the effectiveness of 
company’s business strategy [25]. Researchers have 
demonstrated that some contingency factors would 
moderate the effect of integration strategy, such as firm 
characteristic, consumer characteristic and product 
characteristic [5, 6, 7, 10, 16]. However, those studies 
ignored the platform’s influence. Cross-side network ef-
fect have been emphasized on online platform, which 
refers to the effect that users on each side of the market 
benefit from the number of users on the other side and 
that demand is the driving force for user participation 
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[12, 18]. Hence, in the condition of high product market 
demand, there would exist more competing sellers on 
the platform, which further influence focal company’s 
strategy effectiveness. However, there is limited study 
examining how platform’s market demand influence the 
effectiveness of company’s integration strategy [21]. 
Therefore, this study aims to bridge this gap by examin-
ing whether the platform’s market demand relieve or 
magnify the impact of focal company’s promotion inte-
gration strategy.  
With the transaction data from a Chinese company 
who has stores on two online platforms, the current 
study investigated the impact of promotion depth inte-
gration and promotion timing integration on sales per-
formance. Further, combined with the platform’s prod-
uct market demand index data, we evaluated how plat-
form’s market demand moderate the effect of promotion 
integration strategy. Our research employed a SKU 
(stock keeping unit) level fixed-effect model to generate 
several important findings. First, promotion timing inte-
gration can positively enhance sales performance. Sec-
ond, promotion depth integration would negatively in-
fluence sales performance. Third, the enhancing effect 
of promotion timing integration on sales performance 
was weakened by higher platform’s market demand.  
Thus, this study contributes to the extant literature in 
the following ways. First, although the price and promo-
tion strategy in multichannel retailing has been widely 
discussed, researchers did not focus on the context of 
multiple platforms. Second, we investigated the moder-
ating role of platform’s market demand on the influence 
of promotion integration strategy, which can contribute 
to our understanding of why the platform’s market en-
vironment should be considered when making firm 
strategy. Finally, our study provides practitioners with 
valuable insights about how to manage the promotion 
activity on multiple platforms. 
We first review the related literature and then present 
the hypotheses. Then based on our analysis and findings, 
we would explain the results and propose several future 
research directions. 
2.  Literature review 
The price and promotion management in multichan-
nel retailing has received much attention by scholars 
[14]. Most researchers support for the channel integra-
tion strategy [2, 15, 19], which is defined as providing 
consistent information and integrated functions for cus-
tomers in different channels [10]. For example, [15] 
demonstrated that providing consistent product and 
price information in varied channels can improve the in-
formation quality and customer’s perceived value. 
Moreover, other scholars have diverse opinions about 
multichannel promotion management. For example, [23] 
suggested that it is possible for multichannel retailers to 
charge different price for customers in varied channels. 
Moreover, [4] pointed out that when the promotion is 
differed in terms of price discount and frequency, it 
would lead to the higher total sales. Nevertheless, [13] 
did not find significant effect of the consistent price on 
customer’s channel choice.  
That research has made contribution to the multi-
channel promotion management, but the focus is on the 
relationship of online, offline and other channels, such 
as catalog. Researchers suggested that different cost 
structural in varied channels would lead to the obvious 
differences among each channel’s maximum promotion 
depth [23]. However, among multiple platforms, the dif-
ference about maximum promotion depth in varied plat-
forms would be smaller. Moreover, in the context of 
multiple platforms, customers can easily get product in-
formation from various platforms. But such comparison 
and switching behavior incurs high cost in multichannel 
retailing. Hence, the information asymmetry is lower in 
the context of multiple platforms and the results of mul-
tichannel retailing may not be applicable.  
In addition, firm’s strategy may not always be effec-
tive in each situation [25]. Researchers also pinpointed 
out that it is important to investigate the contextual fac-
tors that influence the effectiveness of integration strat-
egy [21]. Although some studies have found the effect 
of firm’s characteristic, such as firm’s experience in 
online and offline channels [5], human resource capa-
bility [16], consumer’s characteristic, such as shopping 
experience [7, 10] and product type [6], little study has 
investigated the platform’s influence. Existing research-
ers have revealed the cross-side network effect on plat-
form [18], which reflects that users on one side would 
influence the growth of the other side [20]. Hence, cus-
tomer’s demand on the platform would drive more 
sellers to participate in the platform’s competition [12], 
which may further influence focal company’s strategy 
effectiveness. Although the effect of channel integration 
strategy has been demonstrated by a lot of scholars, it is 
still unclear about how it works in varied levels of plat-
form’s market demand. Therefore, this study tends to 
examine the moderating effect of platform’s market de-
mand on the relationship between promotion integration 
strategy and sales performance.   
3.  Hypotheses 
3.1. The relationship between promotion timing 
integration and sales performance 
Promotion timing integration refers to company’s 
practice to implement promotion activity on varied plat-
forms simultaneously. Existing studies suggested that 
integrated marketing communication can enhance 
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customer’s positive attitude toward the retailer [17]. In 
the context of online platform, company needs to imple-
ment a lot of promotion and advertising activity to at-
tract customers and get higher Internet traffic. If com-
pany provides promotion activity in different platforms 
simultaneously, it would increase the company’s expo-
sure toward customers. Such repeated exposure can in-
crease customer’s awareness about the company and its 
offerings [1, 11], which can further increase customer’s 
likelihood to purchase in the focal company. Therefore, 
we hypotheses that: 
H1. Promotion timing integration is positively re-
lated with sales performance.  
3.2. The relationship between promotion depth 
integration and sales performance 
Promotion depth integration refers to company’s 
practice to maintain consistent promotion depth on var-
ied platforms. Although researchers suggested that in-
consistent price information might increase customer’s 
uncertainty and confusion toward the product and seller 
[15], in the context of multiple platforms, promotion 
depth integration might negatively relate with sales per-
formance. Because different platforms have their unique 
characteristic, which is reflected by platform’s opera-
tion style, consumers’ preference and rivals’ competi-
tive strategy. Although price reduction is a useful way 
for company to attract customers and compete with ri-
vals [22], if company remains consistent level of price 
reduction, it may limit the company’s attractiveness and 
competitiveness on the multiple platforms [3]. There-
fore, we hypotheses that: 
H2. Promotion depth integration is negatively re-
lated with sales performance.  
3.3. The moderating effect of platform’s market 
demand on promotion integration strategy and 
sales performance 
According to the cross-side network effect, the 
higher platform’s market demand would drive more 
competitors to enter platform’s competition [12], which 
can further increase product and service choices for cus-
tomers. Although doing promotion activity simultane-
ously on varied platforms can increase customer’s brand 
awareness, it may have limited effect on enhancing 
company’s attractiveness to customers. In the condition 
of high platform market demand, the increased number 
of competitors and alternative offerings might decrease 
focal company’s attractiveness, which thus lead to lower 
sales performance. Moreover, due to the limited 
competitiveness from company’s promotion depth inte-
gration practice, in the condition of high market demand, 
alternatives’ attractiveness would further magnify the 
negative effect of promotion depth integration. Hence, 
we suggest that: 
H3a. Platform’s market demand would negatively 
moderate the relationship between focal company’s 
promotion timing integration and sales performance. 
H3b. Platform’s market demand would positively 
moderate the relationship between focal company’s 
promotion depth integration and sales performance. 
4. Methods and results  
4.1. Data description  
We have transaction data from a Chinese company 
during the period from January 2017 to December 2017. 
This company was founded in 2000, who mainly sells 
the melon seeds through both online and offline chan-
nels. In the online channel, the company sells product 
mainly through two online platforms (TMALL.COM 
and JD.COM). These two platforms differ in terms of 
operation pattern, competition and consumer preference. 
TMALL.COM operates like “shopping mall”, where ex-
ists large number of sellers who can individually man-
age their own stores and sell the products by using plat-
form’s function. While JD.COM combines the opera-
tion way of “supermarket” and “shopping mall”. For the 
“supermarket” way, JD.COM purchases products firstly 
and then sells and deliveries products to consumers. On 
this platform, “supermarket” is the dominant way and 
the platform has multiple own warehouses in order to 
provide quick delivery services to customers. Hence, 
TMALL.COM exists more competitors and alternative 
products than JD.COM. Moreover, consumers always 
purchase for the low-price products in TMALL.COM, 
such as clothes, foods and cosmetics, but prefer to pur-
chase for high-price products in JD.COM, such as elec-
tronic equipment and household appliance. 
This company has their own stores in these two plat-
forms and the sales from their own stores covers most 
of their entire online sales. In order to improve the sales 
performance, company always do a lot of promotion ac-
tivities. For managing the promotion activity, marketing 
manager who takes charge of the one platform should 
plan the promotion activity in advance and get approval 
from the general manager. Their most common promo-
tion way is price discount. By using platform’s price dis-
count function, the discounted products’ website page 
would display the discount information. 
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Table 1. Description statistics about business 
on two platforms 
Variable  TMALL.COM  JD.COM  
Total order number  17336 19564 
Average order price 
23.21  
(s.e.: 11.28) 
30.85  
(s.e.: 6.40) 
Average number of 
SKUs on promotion 
per week 
3.83  
(s.e.: 3.15) 
14.33  
(s.e.: 8.84) 
Average percentage 
of price discount per 
week 
17.04%  
(s.e.: 0.1270) 
17.84%  
(s.e.: 0.1089) 
The source data consist of 36900 records from two 
main platforms of the company. And Table 1 shows the 
basic information about company’s business on these 
two platforms. Each record corresponds to one purchase 
order and fulfillment, which contains the transaction 
time, SKU name, the order volume of the SKU, the orig-
inal price and transaction price for the SKU and other 
consumer demographic information. Given the diversity 
of its products, our analysis includes 10 SKUs which be-
longs to one product category (melon seeds) but with 
varied sizes and tastes. Because our data is based on 
transaction records, we aggregate the transactions at the 
SKU level in each week. Due to the existence of some 
time periods without any transactions on two platforms, 
the final aggregated data includes 301 observations. 
Moreover, for the variable of platform market demand, 
we have the platform’s transaction quantity index about 
melon seeds in TMALL.COM. We also have the mainly 
10 competitor’s transaction volume data in each day in 
TMALL.COM and JD.COM, which are used as control 
variables in our study. The measurements of all the var-
iables are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Measurements of all variables 
 
 
  
Notation Variable Definition Measurements 
𝐿𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑚,𝑡 
Product sales 
quantity 
Logarithm of SKU m’s sales quantity 
in two platforms in week t 
LN⁡(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑚,𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑚,𝑗,𝑡) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡 
Promotion 
depth  
integration 
The similarity of SKU’s discount rate 
in two platforms in week t, the dis-
count rate is calculated as the differ-
ence between original price of SKU 
minus transaction price of SKU, di-
vided by the original price of SKU 
|𝑑𝑖𝑠_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑑𝑖𝑠_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑗,𝑡|*(-1) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_𝑡𝑖𝑚_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡 
Promotion 
timing  
integration 
The percentage of days that two plat-
forms have promotion simultaneously 
in week t, divided by the total number 
of promotion days in two platforms 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖/𝑗,𝑡 
Competitor’s 
sales quantity 
Competitor’s sales quantity in platform 
i/j in week t 
∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑛,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛=10
𝑛=1
 
𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑚 
Previous 
week’ s sales 
quantity 
SKU m’s previous week’ sales quan-
tity in two platforms 
 
𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑡 Festival 
Whether the week t has a traditional or 
business festival day 
If week t has a traditional or business 
festival day, 𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑡=1, else =0 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑦𝑡 Month 
Each month is defined as the dummy 
variable 
11 dummy variables for each month 
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4.2 Model specification  
We developed a fixed-effect model at the SKU-week 
level to analyze the longitudinal dataset because the re-
sult of the Hausman test that we ran suggested that esti-
mates of the fixed-effect model are consistent, while the 
estimates of random-effect model are not. Hence, we 
specified the following two fixed-effect models: 
𝐿𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑚,𝑡 =∙ 𝛼𝑚 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡  
∙ +𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_𝑡𝑖𝑚_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡  
∙ +𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡  
∙ +𝛽4𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑚  
∙ +𝛽6𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  
∙ +𝛽7𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡  
∙ +𝛽8𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑡  
∙ +𝛽9𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑦𝑡  
∙ +𝜀𝑚,𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1) 
 
𝐿𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑚,𝑡 =∙ 𝛼𝑚 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡  
∙ +𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_𝑡𝑖𝑚_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡  
∙ +𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡  
∙ +𝛽4𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡
×𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡  
∙ +𝛽5𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_𝑡𝑖𝑚_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡
×𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡  
∙ +𝛽6𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑚  
∙ +𝛽7𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  
∙ +𝛽8𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡  
∙ +𝛽9𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑡  
∙ +𝛽10𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑦𝑡  
∙ +𝜀𝑚,𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(2) 
 
The only difference between the model 1 and model 
2 is that model 2 adds an interaction term between two 
dimension of promotion integration strategy and plat-
form’s market demand, which tests the moderating ef-
fect proposed in our hypotheses.  
4.3. Heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, 
multicollinearity
To check for serial correlation, we used Wooldridge 
test to examine whether there is first order serial corre-
lation. The results indicated the presence of first-order 
autocorrelation in our panel dataset (F(1,3) = 66.473, p 
< 0.000). To check for heteroscedasticity, we performed 
the Wald test to examine whether the errors are homo-
scedastic. The result indicates the presence of heterosce-
dasticity ((χ² = 242.88, p < 0.000). These two issues 
suggest for using the fixed-effect model with robust 
standard errors [24]. We also checked for multicolline-
arity, the highest variance inflation factor is 3.25, which 
is below the threshold of 10. Moreover, the correlation 
analysis showed in Table 3 represents that the correla-
tion between variables is satisfied. Hence, these results 
indicate that multicollinearity is not a major concern in 
our study. 
Table 3 Correlation analysis 
Variable Mean S. D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Product sales quantity 147.76 419.37 1        
Promotion depth  
integration 
-0.16 0.15 -0.48 1       
Promotion timing 
integration 
0.14 0.27 0.51 -0.11 1      
Platform’s market demand 49134.94 10834.47 0.16 -0.22 0.09 1     
Previous sales 146.74 419.65 0.70 -0.38 0.44 0.16 1    
Competitor’s sales quantity 
in TMALL.COM 
103577.6 299286.5 0.16 -0.12 0.13 0.07 0.21 1   
Competitor’s sales quantity 
in JD.COM 
25383.6 46564.99 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.02 0.13 1  
Festival -- -- 0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.13 -0.25 1 
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4.4. Results  
Table 4 presents the fixed-effect regression results 
for all variables with robust standard errors and the de-
pendent variable is the SKU’s sales quantity on two plat-
forms. The results show that promotion timing integra-
tion is positively related with sales quantity on two plat-
forms (β=0.65, p<0.000). Thus, H1 was supported. Pro-
motion depth integration is negatively related with sales 
quantity on two platforms (β=-0.72, p<0.000), which 
supports H2. Furthermore, the platform’s market de-
mand negatively moderates the relationship between 
promotion timing integration and SKU’s sales quantity 
on two platforms (β=-1.93, p<0.01), which support for 
H3a. But the moderating effect of platform’s market de-
mand does not significantly influence the relationship 
between promotion depth integration and SKU’s sales 
quantity on two platforms (β=0.28, p=0.36). Therefore, 
H3b was not supported.   
4.5. Robustness check  
In order to check the robustness of our estimation, 
several alternative measurements are compared. First, 
we use the sales amount as the alternative way to meas-
ure sales performance and obtained the same substan-
tive findings. Second, we use the absolute price dis-
counts to represent for promotion depth, which provide 
inferior results. Moreover, we aggregate the transaction 
data at each SKU’s month level, which gives similar re-
sults.  
Table 4 Results of fixed-effect model with robust standard errors 
Dependent variable:  
Product sales quantity 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Promotion timing  
integration 
0.65*** (6.46) 0.65***(6.50) 21.20 ** (4.01) 21.60** (4.16) 
Promotion depth  
integration 
-0.72*** (-8.95) -0.95 (-0.24) -0.75*** (-10.64) -3.78 (-1.22) 
Platform market demand 0.83 (1.07) 0.84 (1.27) 0.40 (0.52) 0.53 (0.82) 
Promotion depth integration * 
Platform market demand  
 0.02 (0.06)  0.28 (0.96) 
Promotion timing integration 
* Platform market demand 
  -1.89 **(-3.89) -1.93** (-4.04) 
Previous week’s sales  
quantity  
0.20*** (5.93) 0.20*** (6.55) 0.17 **(4.49) 0.17*** (4.86) 
Competitor’s sales volume in 
TAMLL.COM 
-0.05 (-1.09) -0.05 (-1.04) -0.06 (-1.38) -0.06 (-1.3) 
Competitor’s sales volume in 
JD.COM 
0.28 (1.44) 0.28 (1.45) 0.31 (1.71) 0.31 (1.71) 
Festival 0.26 (1.46) 0.26 (1.55) 0.36 (1.68) 0.37 (1.76) 
_cons -8.85 (-0.94) -8.97 (-1.11) -4.29 (-0.47) -5.74 (-0.72) 
SKU fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 45.73% 45.73% 49.62% 49.70% 
Notes: *sig at 0.05, **sig at 0.01, ***sig at 0.001.
5. Discussion 
The current research has studied the impact of pro-
motion integration strategy on sales performance and 
considered the moderating effect of platform’s market 
demand in the context of multiple platforms. The results 
show that promotion timing integration is positively re-
lated with sales performance, which is consistent with 
most studies’ viewpoint that channel integration strat-
egy can lead to positive firm level outcome [5, 16]. 
However, deviating from most studies in multichannel 
retailing, promotion depth integration is negatively re-
lated with sales performance, which indicates the nega-
tive side of integration strategy. The above findings 
complement the knowledge gap about the promotion 
strategy on multiple platforms [14].  
Moreover, our study also uncovered the role of plat-
form’s market demand. We demonstrated that high plat-
form’s market demand would negatively influence the 
effect of promotion timing integration. This result sup-
plements our understanding about platform’s influence 
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on the effectiveness of integration strategy [21]. But our 
study does not show the significant influence of plat-
form’s market demand on the effect of promotion depth 
integration. A possible explanation could be that when 
in the condition of high product demand, customers may 
engage in impulsive purchase and may not care about 
the nuanced differences in price and promotion in two 
platforms.  
The findings of the current study also offer guide-
lines for managers to implement promotion activity on 
different platforms. Specifically, we suggest that 
providing promotion activity simultaneously on differ-
ent platforms can lead to the synergy effect, which 
means that when company offers promotion simultane-
ously, the whole sales performance is greater than the 
simple sum of two platforms. But companies are sup-
posed to decide the promotion depth according to con-
sumer and platform’s characteristics. Moreover, in the 
condition of high platform’s market demand, the effect 
of promotion integration strategy is limited, thus com-
panies should complement it with other marketing strat-
egy. 
We believe that our findings provide unique theoret-
ical and practical insights about the effect of promotion 
integration strategy and platform’s market demand. 
However, it still has some limitations that should be 
considered by future studies. First, the current study 
only provides the correlational results about the rela-
tionship between promotion integration strategy and 
sales performance. Future study can use field experi-
ment to test for the causal effect of promotion integra-
tion strategy on sales. Second, due to the data limitation, 
we only focused on one company who sells nuts in 
China. Hence, the results of this study may not be ap-
propriately generalized to other companies and indus-
tries. Future study can expand the sample size. Third, 
this study only considered the level of promotion depth 
and timing, future study can add in comparison of pro-
motion type and company’s deal support. 
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